Re: PHILOSOPHY AS THE DENIAL OF PHILOSOPHY

Thanks. Jud, as you perhaps can see below, your response has come with weird
characters and no gaps between paragraphs at all, just a dense, hard to read
block of text; perhaps you've sent it from a text processor first and pasted
it into the email app... all sense of discourse is disrupted by this
rendition: can you send it without all the typo-junk (in the way you
normally send)? I can just about read it but it's difficult to differentiate
our two threads now nevermind what happens when I try to intervene :-)

If it's not possible then I'll try and sort the mess out and respond.

regards

michaelP

ps: the mishmash might be caused by the computational difference (between
PCs and Macs) :-)

>
In a message dated 26/08/2004 17:00:05 GMT Standard Time,
>
michael@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:

Jud in rsponse to my statements
> concerning what I think Heidegger means by
"be-ing":

> Like the belief in
> God is in itself not dangerous [as I have just written
in
> my previous
> post] — it is the social and political outcomes that flow
from
>
> such beliefs that are dangerous, so the nurturing of a belief or faith in
>
an
> uncognisable, un-pinpointable, "useless "[to quote your words]
> imagined
> reality of a transcendental "Being,"

But, Jud, I have just
> said that being is nothing to be believed or not
believed because it is
> not an object of belief or disbelief because it is
not an object.


>
Jud:
Michael [with genuine respect] it does not need to be an "object" [an
>
existent or hands on material thing]
to be believed in. If it WERE an
> object like you suggest [it isn't] there
would be no need to believe in
> it.
Things which exist don't need to be belived in - they are simply
> entities of
which we are aware.
When I use the word "object" in sentences
> such as: "Being" is an object of a
Heideggerian's belief, I employ the
> word "object"
I use it in the grammatical sense of object as a
> constituent that is acted
upon - "the object of the verb "to
> believe."
Thus "Being" is the object of a Heideggerian believing that
> "Being" can be
talked about in a meaningful way, whereas a non-believer
> believes that
such talk of "Being" as constituting a viable and meangful
> object of
philosphical discussion is meaningless as well as being
> "useless" as you have
already inteligently pointed out.


Michael:

> Again, it is not an object of belief or faith or any thing
else, since it
> is not an object (rather the objectivity, or rather the
object-ing of the
> objective) nor a thing (thus not a some thing, rather the
thing-ing of
> things, thus not itself a thing), but neither is it nothing
(just because
> it is no thing);

Jud:
The "object-ing of the objective" is just another
> way of saying a
"reification of..."
It is precisely this "ontological
> misdemenour" or "cognitive vandalism"
[this is not to impute that you
> personally are a criminal or a vandal] which
causes all the
> trouble.
"Being" has GOT TO BE an article of faith, for if "Being" WAS
> obvious,
explainable, detectable, definable,
etc., there would be no need
> to believe in it. (see Voltaire]
Things which exist don't need to be
> believed in - they are simply entities
of which we are aware.
THERE IS NO
> NEED to objectfy that which already exists for it is
automatically
> objectified in its existing.
Objectification and existing are EXACTLY the
> same existential states.
That which doesn't exist cannot be objectified.
> An object is an
objectification of itself. It needs no
human observer or
> commentator to objectify the objectified.


MichaeL

Of course, it _is
> nothing_ to one who only
believes or hankers after things (stuff, bodies,
> material particles, forces,
etc); yes, one can believe in things (stuff,
> etc) and superthings (gods,
Nature, the Cosmos, The Revolution, History,
> The Universe, Mankind,
Nationhood, the Ecosystem, etc). But one cannot and
> does not believe or have
faith in something which is not some thing (or
> superthing), whether existent
in your eyes or not.

Jud:
Faith in
> something which patently and manifestly exists is not neccessary.
Faith
> is only required in those notions which do not exist. All that exists
as
> far as "Being" is concerned, is the human being who
thinks it meaningful as
> something which is thought by the person you thinks
it meaningful.
My
> observations regarding the basic meaninglessness of "Being" do not
>
represent a hankering for things material,
but simply the reaction of a
> mind such as mine to such claims after a life
long consideration of the
> facts and the
nature of the people that propose such beliefs and their
> historical and
modern agenda.


Michael:
I completely agree with your
> sentiments concerning
religiosity and its dangers especially in an age
> that employs such
religiosities in accordance with the dance of gestell
> and widerville (which
just uses every thing and everything up to promote
> and continue its self
regardless, lacking all reck (and I always have
> agreed with you on that).
It's just that your take on (Heidegger's notion
> of) being is in error with
respect to this business of it being some kind
> of religious or
transcendental object of belief and faith: for Heidegger,
> IMO, god and gods,
not to mention dogs, are precisely beings and thus
> precisely NOT BE-ING.


Jud:
To be a being means it must Be - it must
> exist. "God" and "Being" [and
existence]
do not exist, and therfore do
> not qualify to be treated [cognised of]
philosophically in
the same way
> as A being To treat "Being" in such a way is an ontological
and
> catagorial
falsehood which I am sure in you case is due to a
> misunderstanding NOT a
form of deviousness.

Michael:
And, as I have
> written today to Gary, be-ing is as far from an abstraction
as could
> possibly be.

Jud:
It is for it is in the same category as
> "arm-stretching" or "horse-riding" -
it is an abstraction we huse to
> desribe the actions of the arm-strexher of
the horse rider and the horses
> action. "Being" is an abstraction used by
Heidegger to describe BOTH the
> existential modality of the life the human leads
AND ALSO the "pure
> presence" This so-called "ontological differece" is the
misconstrued,
> misunderstood ship upon which his frail ontological bark founders.


> MichaeL;
Thus however abstract you might want to paint be-ing
(like the
> notion of the christian god as being most abstract compared to the
god and
> gods of the jews and greeks resp.) and thus compare it to a
> rarefied
version of an absent transcendent god (as many Heideggerians have
> attempted
to do not to mention the deux absenta of Negative Theology),
> this is utterly
wrong, IMO. So think again. Try thinking what is not any
> thing whatsoever
but not nothing either. In another post, I shall present
> an example that
comes from mathematics that kinda mirrors this seemingly
> impossible X that
is not nothing but not some thing either but which we
> can think...

Jud:
What is not any thing whatsoever but not nothing either
> is a meaningless
notion.
A thing CANNOT NOT BE NOTHING - Nothing cannot
> be either something or
nothing.
Nothing as Parmenides said cannot be
> talked about [I add meaningfully]

with a reciprocated respect

and
> regards

Jud

In a rush - probable typos will be found - Dinner at 7.30
> wit a grown up son
and partner.

I'm out of door!


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