-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]Namens michaelP
Verzonden: dinsdag 19 oktober 2004 9:59
Aan: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Onderwerp: anti or antique heidegger?
renerecently to an antiheideggerian:
> In fact one has to be antiheidegger
> in order to find one's ownmost
rene, apart from considerations of the very quality of such antiheidegger
stands, and the relation between follower and followed, leader and the lead,
it has occured to me recently and in a vaguely troubled way that one does
not necessarily have be antiheidegger since there are clues in the writing
that heidegger did it himself.
Michael, the sentence 'Heidegger was (is and always will be) a Nazi', just
as the sentence 'x is a follower of a leader' - i was not thinking of you
- are, formally, predications of a subject. Jud's dilemma lies in the fact
that he desperately denies the possibility of essential predication, while
he needs it even more desperately, in order to be able to pin his Heidegger
down. (or Semite women)
Here 'is' the preying, the nachstellen of a subject, but without, as in
Nietzsche, the obliged reflection. It's just done, and this machination
needs the continuing holocaust Erlebnis for its legitimation. Lastly,
i don't see the point of taking offense here, because he so clearly shows
the inevitability of widerwille, repulsion, for a will that does not really
know what it wants. The intensity of his hatred - not a mere emotional affect,
but a deeper and clearer passion, as Heidegger explains the difference in the
treatment of WtP in Nietzsche 1 -, arouses annoyance, sure, but at the same
time offers the occasion of seeing widerwille at work/in reality, to see that
it is not free, driven. There's just the one condition to accept, that knowledge
of will and antiwill is only gainable in oneself. Will only works on will, and
widerwill on widerwill. - But then, the demise is not one of the list, but in
those leaving on account of it.
Therefore one has to take care with new predications, like my 'Jud is a racist'.
Instead of attributing a property to a subject, which strictly spoken makes no
sense anymore in this world of non-things and non-humans and non-truth, what i
mean by it is precisely the opposite: racism, submission of inferior life forms,
occupies Jud (the predicate eats the subject), as soon as his common sense enters
philosophy. Including his entire predication theory. He thinks to outwit us, or
Heidegger, or Hannah Arendt (imperialism+racism), but no, it's the other way around.
What a chance to become honest toward oneself, one should be grateful. Esp. now
that he thinks that the 'demise' of the Heidegger list is his work. Maybe it would
seem so, for instance if a poll would be held, but one immediately recognizes the
same mechanism in all polls: the machination of will and widerwill.
Short: one is enabled to see the role of the 'subject' - variously said - inside
the Gestell (a fully problematic title), its being used: the subject has become
Bestandstueck, piece of inventory. (and therefore not to be saved: see below)
In that sense, might it be needful to open up
a discussion concerning the notion of two heideggers, neither the early/late
pair, nor the pre-kehre/post-kehre, but one seeking to pietistically
preserve/recover the metaphysical tradition, the other to
demolish/deconstruct the same? Of course, I do not mean a double
'personality' or any such psychologistical tosh, but something discernible
in the texts as they battle out the future and past of thinking. [In my
planned opera, there shall be two heideggers on stage at times, but that's
the way of drama and not the path of thinking]. I think derrida was most
sensitive to these two heideggers and the way they interwove as texts which
he reperforms thoughout his complex relations (proximity and distance) with
heidegger. Is there a space to discuss this notion without recourse to pulp
and its purveyors?
I think so, yes. The tear would go through all of us: we should be subject
AND Dasein (as possibility).
Everything would depend on how to take the duplicity. One can see suddenly
the complexity of our situation: as long as the leap into Dasein is not
made, there is only (post-)metaphysics to represent it. But metaphyical
thinking cannot think metaphysics, its ground or Wesen, itself. (Otherwise
there never would have been metaphysics) So everything depends on re-thinking
the question "What is metaphysics?", while the what-is-question (ti to on)
is itself a metaphysical start. It would be metaphysics itself (as nihilism)
that holds one tight on the spot. In this repulsive sphere, where one closes
one eye, or loses one leg, in order not to experience the split, words like
being and Dasein lose all that they have possibly in them.
But the worst one can do, is protesting against it, because this missing
belongs to being, which now is nothing but absence (oblivion), but as such an
eminent indication. As long as the staying out is not conceived in its last
consequences, the transition to Dasein cannot be enacted. This would advocate
demolition, so it seems. But it is to be done with utmost care and precision,
because one needs metaphysics/nihilism/technology in order to turn against.
Otherwise one enters the postmodern space where everything can be said
indifferently.
regards
rene
regards
michaelP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---