There might be something to this. Is it 'essential predication' or something
less?
If it was less, then it would be highly arguable as to it's reality, no?
So he says.
To be 'essentially predicated' as to the act, which in this case was to be
in agreement, sympathy, with a particular political expression, seems to me
absurd. Always at the moment, it was never even understood, that was purely
and simply so. If it was understood as so at the moment, then it would be in
agreement universally as to it's ultimate practical nature, which it never
was. It was hidden, undisclosed, and even cloaked in something else, wunder.
So it was not yet of any consequence.
He says assertions which are universally true, based on hindsight. This
wilderville was only turning around onto it's self, seeming to reflect on a
lust which empathized with only what was expected, a sort of technological
solution, which then blossomed into madness. We are not yet free anywhere of
that yet. As you can still see, there are no solutions working. The climate
changes daily, and we only report on that. So it changes for the worst, and
we still wait and only comment. Yet what is not yet a priority is the
beginning of the 'reckoning' as our own has stated, amigoes.
Yet the earth continues to get scalded by us, as we drive along the desert
highway. When will we understand a thing?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker@xxxxxx>
To: <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 8:57 AM
Subject: RE: anti or antique heidegger?
>
>
> -----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
> Van: owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]Namens michaelP
> Verzonden: dinsdag 19 oktober 2004 9:59
> Aan: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Onderwerp: anti or antique heidegger?
>
>
> renerecently to an antiheideggerian:
>
> > In fact one has to be antiheidegger
> > in order to find one's ownmost
>
>
> rene, apart from considerations of the very quality of such antiheidegger
> stands, and the relation between follower and followed, leader and the
lead,
> it has occured to me recently and in a vaguely troubled way that one does
> not necessarily have be antiheidegger since there are clues in the writing
> that heidegger did it himself.
>
> Michael, the sentence 'Heidegger was (is and always will be) a Nazi',
just
> as the sentence 'x is a follower of a leader' - i was not thinking of
you
> - are, formally, predications of a subject. Jud's dilemma lies in the
fact
> that he desperately denies the possibility of essential predication,
while
> he needs it even more desperately, in order to be able to pin his
Heidegger
> down. (or Semite women)
> Here 'is' the preying, the nachstellen of a subject, but without, as in
> Nietzsche, the obliged reflection. It's just done, and this machination
> needs the continuing holocaust Erlebnis for its legitimation. Lastly,
> i don't see the point of taking offense here, because he so clearly
shows
> the inevitability of widerwille, repulsion, for a will that does not
really
> know what it wants. The intensity of his hatred - not a mere emotional
affect,
> but a deeper and clearer passion, as Heidegger explains the difference
in the
> treatment of WtP in Nietzsche 1 -, arouses annoyance, sure, but at the
same
> time offers the occasion of seeing widerwille at work/in reality, to see
that
> it is not free, driven. There's just the one condition to accept, that
knowledge
> of will and antiwill is only gainable in oneself. Will only works on
will, and
> widerwill on widerwill. - But then, the demise is not one of the list,
but in
> those leaving on account of it.
>
> Therefore one has to take care with new predications, like my 'Jud is a
racist'.
> Instead of attributing a property to a subject, which strictly spoken
makes no
> sense anymore in this world of non-things and non-humans and non-truth,
what i
> mean by it is precisely the opposite: racism, submission of inferior
life forms,
> occupies Jud (the predicate eats the subject), as soon as his common
sense enters
> philosophy. Including his entire predication theory. He thinks to outwit
us, or
> Heidegger, or Hannah Arendt (imperialism+racism), but no, it's the other
way around.
> What a chance to become honest toward oneself, one should be grateful.
Esp. now
> that he thinks that the 'demise' of the Heidegger list is his work.
Maybe it would
> seem so, for instance if a poll would be held, but one immediately
recognizes the
> same mechanism in all polls: the machination of will and widerwill.
>
> Short: one is enabled to see the role of the 'subject' - variously
said - inside
> the Gestell (a fully problematic title), its being used: the subject has
become
> Bestandstueck, piece of inventory. (and therefore not to be saved: see
below)
>
>
> In that sense, might it be needful to open up
> a discussion concerning the notion of two heideggers, neither the
early/late
> pair, nor the pre-kehre/post-kehre, but one seeking to pietistically
> preserve/recover the metaphysical tradition, the other to
> demolish/deconstruct the same? Of course, I do not mean a double
> 'personality' or any such psychologistical tosh, but something discernible
> in the texts as they battle out the future and past of thinking. [In my
> planned opera, there shall be two heideggers on stage at times, but that's
> the way of drama and not the path of thinking]. I think derrida was most
> sensitive to these two heideggers and the way they interwove as texts
which
> he reperforms thoughout his complex relations (proximity and distance)
with
> heidegger. Is there a space to discuss this notion without recourse to
pulp
> and its purveyors?
>
>
> I think so, yes. The tear would go through all of us: we should be
subject
> AND Dasein (as possibility).
> Everything would depend on how to take the duplicity. One can see
suddenly
> the complexity of our situation: as long as the leap into Dasein is not
> made, there is only (post-)metaphysics to represent it. But metaphyical
> thinking cannot think metaphysics, its ground or Wesen, itself.
(Otherwise
> there never would have been metaphysics) So everything depends on
re-thinking
> the question "What is metaphysics?", while the what-is-question (ti to
on)
> is itself a metaphysical start. It would be metaphysics itself (as
nihilism)
> that holds one tight on the spot. In this repulsive sphere, where one
closes
> one eye, or loses one leg, in order not to experience the split, words
like
> being and Dasein lose all that they have possibly in them.
> But the worst one can do, is protesting against it, because this missing
> belongs to being, which now is nothing but absence (oblivion), but as
such an
> eminent indication. As long as the staying out is not conceived in its
last
> consequences, the transition to Dasein cannot be enacted. This would
advocate
> demolition, so it seems. But it is to be done with utmost care and
precision,
> because one needs metaphysics/nihilism/technology in order to turn
against.
> Otherwise one enters the postmodern space where everything can be said
> indifferently.
>
> regards
> rene
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> regards
>
> michaelP
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
less?
If it was less, then it would be highly arguable as to it's reality, no?
So he says.
To be 'essentially predicated' as to the act, which in this case was to be
in agreement, sympathy, with a particular political expression, seems to me
absurd. Always at the moment, it was never even understood, that was purely
and simply so. If it was understood as so at the moment, then it would be in
agreement universally as to it's ultimate practical nature, which it never
was. It was hidden, undisclosed, and even cloaked in something else, wunder.
So it was not yet of any consequence.
He says assertions which are universally true, based on hindsight. This
wilderville was only turning around onto it's self, seeming to reflect on a
lust which empathized with only what was expected, a sort of technological
solution, which then blossomed into madness. We are not yet free anywhere of
that yet. As you can still see, there are no solutions working. The climate
changes daily, and we only report on that. So it changes for the worst, and
we still wait and only comment. Yet what is not yet a priority is the
beginning of the 'reckoning' as our own has stated, amigoes.
Yet the earth continues to get scalded by us, as we drive along the desert
highway. When will we understand a thing?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bakker, R.B.M. de" <R.B.M.deBakker@xxxxxx>
To: <heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 8:57 AM
Subject: RE: anti or antique heidegger?
>
>
> -----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
> Van: owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:owner-heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]Namens michaelP
> Verzonden: dinsdag 19 oktober 2004 9:59
> Aan: heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Onderwerp: anti or antique heidegger?
>
>
> renerecently to an antiheideggerian:
>
> > In fact one has to be antiheidegger
> > in order to find one's ownmost
>
>
> rene, apart from considerations of the very quality of such antiheidegger
> stands, and the relation between follower and followed, leader and the
lead,
> it has occured to me recently and in a vaguely troubled way that one does
> not necessarily have be antiheidegger since there are clues in the writing
> that heidegger did it himself.
>
> Michael, the sentence 'Heidegger was (is and always will be) a Nazi',
just
> as the sentence 'x is a follower of a leader' - i was not thinking of
you
> - are, formally, predications of a subject. Jud's dilemma lies in the
fact
> that he desperately denies the possibility of essential predication,
while
> he needs it even more desperately, in order to be able to pin his
Heidegger
> down. (or Semite women)
> Here 'is' the preying, the nachstellen of a subject, but without, as in
> Nietzsche, the obliged reflection. It's just done, and this machination
> needs the continuing holocaust Erlebnis for its legitimation. Lastly,
> i don't see the point of taking offense here, because he so clearly
shows
> the inevitability of widerwille, repulsion, for a will that does not
really
> know what it wants. The intensity of his hatred - not a mere emotional
affect,
> but a deeper and clearer passion, as Heidegger explains the difference
in the
> treatment of WtP in Nietzsche 1 -, arouses annoyance, sure, but at the
same
> time offers the occasion of seeing widerwille at work/in reality, to see
that
> it is not free, driven. There's just the one condition to accept, that
knowledge
> of will and antiwill is only gainable in oneself. Will only works on
will, and
> widerwill on widerwill. - But then, the demise is not one of the list,
but in
> those leaving on account of it.
>
> Therefore one has to take care with new predications, like my 'Jud is a
racist'.
> Instead of attributing a property to a subject, which strictly spoken
makes no
> sense anymore in this world of non-things and non-humans and non-truth,
what i
> mean by it is precisely the opposite: racism, submission of inferior
life forms,
> occupies Jud (the predicate eats the subject), as soon as his common
sense enters
> philosophy. Including his entire predication theory. He thinks to outwit
us, or
> Heidegger, or Hannah Arendt (imperialism+racism), but no, it's the other
way around.
> What a chance to become honest toward oneself, one should be grateful.
Esp. now
> that he thinks that the 'demise' of the Heidegger list is his work.
Maybe it would
> seem so, for instance if a poll would be held, but one immediately
recognizes the
> same mechanism in all polls: the machination of will and widerwill.
>
> Short: one is enabled to see the role of the 'subject' - variously
said - inside
> the Gestell (a fully problematic title), its being used: the subject has
become
> Bestandstueck, piece of inventory. (and therefore not to be saved: see
below)
>
>
> In that sense, might it be needful to open up
> a discussion concerning the notion of two heideggers, neither the
early/late
> pair, nor the pre-kehre/post-kehre, but one seeking to pietistically
> preserve/recover the metaphysical tradition, the other to
> demolish/deconstruct the same? Of course, I do not mean a double
> 'personality' or any such psychologistical tosh, but something discernible
> in the texts as they battle out the future and past of thinking. [In my
> planned opera, there shall be two heideggers on stage at times, but that's
> the way of drama and not the path of thinking]. I think derrida was most
> sensitive to these two heideggers and the way they interwove as texts
which
> he reperforms thoughout his complex relations (proximity and distance)
with
> heidegger. Is there a space to discuss this notion without recourse to
pulp
> and its purveyors?
>
>
> I think so, yes. The tear would go through all of us: we should be
subject
> AND Dasein (as possibility).
> Everything would depend on how to take the duplicity. One can see
suddenly
> the complexity of our situation: as long as the leap into Dasein is not
> made, there is only (post-)metaphysics to represent it. But metaphyical
> thinking cannot think metaphysics, its ground or Wesen, itself.
(Otherwise
> there never would have been metaphysics) So everything depends on
re-thinking
> the question "What is metaphysics?", while the what-is-question (ti to
on)
> is itself a metaphysical start. It would be metaphysics itself (as
nihilism)
> that holds one tight on the spot. In this repulsive sphere, where one
closes
> one eye, or loses one leg, in order not to experience the split, words
like
> being and Dasein lose all that they have possibly in them.
> But the worst one can do, is protesting against it, because this missing
> belongs to being, which now is nothing but absence (oblivion), but as
such an
> eminent indication. As long as the staying out is not conceived in its
last
> consequences, the transition to Dasein cannot be enacted. This would
advocate
> demolition, so it seems. But it is to be done with utmost care and
precision,
> because one needs metaphysics/nihilism/technology in order to turn
against.
> Otherwise one enters the postmodern space where everything can be said
> indifferently.
>
> regards
> rene
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> regards
>
> michaelP
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
>
> --- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---