Kevin Eldred wrote:
So what the hell does Heidegger mean by "disclosedness", as
distinct from "revealedness" (if anything)? Any he*lp would
be much appreciated. Truth (well, section 44 at least)
stands waiting.
--- I think that when Heidegger says that something like
"Dasein is its disclosedness", he is referring to the world
as it is disclosed to Dasein. He says disclosedness to avoid
falling into something which might be called perceptionism.
One does not see "green, brown, shape = tree", but rather
the trees in the forest along the woodpath (to use a homey
example). This disclosedness is the world in its horizons
which is available to Dasein in a certain finitude
(horizonality, limits of seeing and having the world). When
H sais that dasein *is* it's disclosedness, he is saying
that this is an immanent structure that is apprehendable in
immanece (like the structures of intentionality for
Husserl). One can sort of imagine Husserl transposed up,
out, and around to get to Heideggerian phemenology. At the
same time, he is saying that this disclosedness is not
simply the "around which" of the Object present to the
intuiting/intentionally directed Subject, but that this very
around which is itself part of the structural Being of
dasein. Dasein has this constant structure: of an around
which is the having of the world. It is not "percept", but
has a perceptual substrate or in a certain way "matter",
but it is always disclosed as something whose Being is
comprehensible only within immanence. So it is always: the
park down the street, the table where the boys just ate, the
motorcycle driving by, the kind of sneakers that Michael
Jordan wears, etc. The "disclosedness is the constant first
cut that is always happening". Revealed would seem to me to
be more something that is a kind of special event of
disclosedness: revelation arises in a particular condition
of expectation, investigation, whereas disclosedness might
be more neutral and constant. Any "having" of the particular
kind involved here, which is not having as possessing, as in
possessing a car, but having a view, an environment, etc.,
in so far as it is available to Dasein, is available as
disclosed.
The double structure of BT, in which Being "fatefully grasps
itself" is such that the Existential Analytic recapitulates
the structures that are *aready the structures of dasein* in
such a way that these structures clarify themselves in the
process of at the same time appropriating themselves *for
the very investigation at hand*. A supremely bootstrap
operation. So: disclosedness is a fundamental structure of
dasein, but at the same time, when dasien takes up, among
the things it has to take up, the question of Being, that
disclosedness may disclose its own being-discloseness,
understanding can develop itself in interpretation (which it
always already does) to the end of interpreting what is,
specifically, *understanding*, etc. Or these things can go
wrong and you get Descartes et al.
I think its probably very important that section 44 happens
after many structures of Dasein have already received
preliminary investigation. I think it is a terrible problem
that Heidegger's world is a world of things, motorcyles
training off, tools and what not. The relation to the Other
really is given this secondary status, whereas in fact it
may be that the whole phenomenology of the worldhood of the
world and the structures of Dasein is itself in fact
*derivative*, which might seem a surprising thing to say
about Heidegger. Derivative of the *much more* primordial
moments of the relation to the other. Even fear may in fact
be not a "best example", but one of the more derivative
ones. If this is true, I think that Being and Time would
have to be rewritten. But what does that have to do with
disclosedness? One think I know is that I can "get" what
Heidegger means when he says that Dasein *is* its
disclosedess, and as I indicated above, I think this works
against some kind of perceptualism and its attendant
metaphysics.
Let's see. From section 32 (H151), we have "In the
projecting of the understanding, entities are disclosed in
their possibility". He makes his way to a discussion of the
"meaning". He says, "Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as
the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be filled in by
entities discoverable in that disclosedness". Yes:
revealing, or uncovering, discovering is a kind of event
within a kind of much more general, neutral, structural
"disclosedness". Uncovering, as relating to "covering", as a
kind of anti-covering, relates back to the gesture of
covering which is much more specifically "intentional" or
willful, whereas discosedness is just the "it happens that
here is this stuff, my view, this horizon", a certain moment
of the ongoing given of the world. But again, this given, as
neutral as it may seem, as dominated by moods, as perhaps as
capricious as the weather, Heidegger wants to somehow
reunite or unite with Daseins understanding of itself.
Uncovering happens within disclosedness. Disclosedness is
the inseparable and primordial union of the world and dasein
in its particular and constantly changing finitude and
horizonal infinity and limitation, which gets broken up into
"intentionality" for Husserl. This breaking up happens, for
example, when Husserl grabs the die and starts turning it
around. Disclosedness relates to the gambling table on which
the dice appears in the first place, the room, the table,
room, bar (as if it were that situation).
Yet, again, I'm still very inclined to say that his series
of examples are still very deriviative from much more
primordial examples: the disclosedness of the other, the
mother, the father, sister, friend, brother. These are so
much more central. Instead of keeping in good form and
getting at primordial phenomena and then working up to a
later and more competent discussion of the other, we get
Guilt. The Heideggerian man walks around looking at things,
in a more sophisticated way than that of the Husserialn man,
to be sure, but not people. Bad business. But that's another
post.
Ideally, "to disclose" would be a kind of eventful happening
of disclosure. To disclose would involve a laying openin
such that dasien comports itself into a general
understanding which opens up a general horizon. It is not so
much that dasien "discloses" actively as it brings its
constant disclosedness into a particular world. Disclosure
here would be on the order of actively opening up a Theme,
for example, while within the theme particiular things would
be uncovered. But of course, first these entities would be
disclosed, then they would be worked over, interpreted,
clarified, discovered, and new things would develop, and so
forth. Does Heidegger mean this by the verbal form "to
disclose" as opposed to a more neutral "disclosedness"?
---
There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.
Tom Blancato
tblancato@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
So what the hell does Heidegger mean by "disclosedness", as
distinct from "revealedness" (if anything)? Any he*lp would
be much appreciated. Truth (well, section 44 at least)
stands waiting.
--- I think that when Heidegger says that something like
"Dasein is its disclosedness", he is referring to the world
as it is disclosed to Dasein. He says disclosedness to avoid
falling into something which might be called perceptionism.
One does not see "green, brown, shape = tree", but rather
the trees in the forest along the woodpath (to use a homey
example). This disclosedness is the world in its horizons
which is available to Dasein in a certain finitude
(horizonality, limits of seeing and having the world). When
H sais that dasein *is* it's disclosedness, he is saying
that this is an immanent structure that is apprehendable in
immanece (like the structures of intentionality for
Husserl). One can sort of imagine Husserl transposed up,
out, and around to get to Heideggerian phemenology. At the
same time, he is saying that this disclosedness is not
simply the "around which" of the Object present to the
intuiting/intentionally directed Subject, but that this very
around which is itself part of the structural Being of
dasein. Dasein has this constant structure: of an around
which is the having of the world. It is not "percept", but
has a perceptual substrate or in a certain way "matter",
but it is always disclosed as something whose Being is
comprehensible only within immanence. So it is always: the
park down the street, the table where the boys just ate, the
motorcycle driving by, the kind of sneakers that Michael
Jordan wears, etc. The "disclosedness is the constant first
cut that is always happening". Revealed would seem to me to
be more something that is a kind of special event of
disclosedness: revelation arises in a particular condition
of expectation, investigation, whereas disclosedness might
be more neutral and constant. Any "having" of the particular
kind involved here, which is not having as possessing, as in
possessing a car, but having a view, an environment, etc.,
in so far as it is available to Dasein, is available as
disclosed.
The double structure of BT, in which Being "fatefully grasps
itself" is such that the Existential Analytic recapitulates
the structures that are *aready the structures of dasein* in
such a way that these structures clarify themselves in the
process of at the same time appropriating themselves *for
the very investigation at hand*. A supremely bootstrap
operation. So: disclosedness is a fundamental structure of
dasein, but at the same time, when dasien takes up, among
the things it has to take up, the question of Being, that
disclosedness may disclose its own being-discloseness,
understanding can develop itself in interpretation (which it
always already does) to the end of interpreting what is,
specifically, *understanding*, etc. Or these things can go
wrong and you get Descartes et al.
I think its probably very important that section 44 happens
after many structures of Dasein have already received
preliminary investigation. I think it is a terrible problem
that Heidegger's world is a world of things, motorcyles
training off, tools and what not. The relation to the Other
really is given this secondary status, whereas in fact it
may be that the whole phenomenology of the worldhood of the
world and the structures of Dasein is itself in fact
*derivative*, which might seem a surprising thing to say
about Heidegger. Derivative of the *much more* primordial
moments of the relation to the other. Even fear may in fact
be not a "best example", but one of the more derivative
ones. If this is true, I think that Being and Time would
have to be rewritten. But what does that have to do with
disclosedness? One think I know is that I can "get" what
Heidegger means when he says that Dasein *is* its
disclosedess, and as I indicated above, I think this works
against some kind of perceptualism and its attendant
metaphysics.
Let's see. From section 32 (H151), we have "In the
projecting of the understanding, entities are disclosed in
their possibility". He makes his way to a discussion of the
"meaning". He says, "Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as
the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be filled in by
entities discoverable in that disclosedness". Yes:
revealing, or uncovering, discovering is a kind of event
within a kind of much more general, neutral, structural
"disclosedness". Uncovering, as relating to "covering", as a
kind of anti-covering, relates back to the gesture of
covering which is much more specifically "intentional" or
willful, whereas discosedness is just the "it happens that
here is this stuff, my view, this horizon", a certain moment
of the ongoing given of the world. But again, this given, as
neutral as it may seem, as dominated by moods, as perhaps as
capricious as the weather, Heidegger wants to somehow
reunite or unite with Daseins understanding of itself.
Uncovering happens within disclosedness. Disclosedness is
the inseparable and primordial union of the world and dasein
in its particular and constantly changing finitude and
horizonal infinity and limitation, which gets broken up into
"intentionality" for Husserl. This breaking up happens, for
example, when Husserl grabs the die and starts turning it
around. Disclosedness relates to the gambling table on which
the dice appears in the first place, the room, the table,
room, bar (as if it were that situation).
Yet, again, I'm still very inclined to say that his series
of examples are still very deriviative from much more
primordial examples: the disclosedness of the other, the
mother, the father, sister, friend, brother. These are so
much more central. Instead of keeping in good form and
getting at primordial phenomena and then working up to a
later and more competent discussion of the other, we get
Guilt. The Heideggerian man walks around looking at things,
in a more sophisticated way than that of the Husserialn man,
to be sure, but not people. Bad business. But that's another
post.
Ideally, "to disclose" would be a kind of eventful happening
of disclosure. To disclose would involve a laying openin
such that dasien comports itself into a general
understanding which opens up a general horizon. It is not so
much that dasien "discloses" actively as it brings its
constant disclosedness into a particular world. Disclosure
here would be on the order of actively opening up a Theme,
for example, while within the theme particiular things would
be uncovered. But of course, first these entities would be
disclosed, then they would be worked over, interpreted,
clarified, discovered, and new things would develop, and so
forth. Does Heidegger mean this by the verbal form "to
disclose" as opposed to a more neutral "disclosedness"?
---
There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.
Tom Blancato
tblancato@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------