In a previous post, someone wrote:
I believe that
"an argument that the History of Being is anything but a teleological
one in a very strong sense is going to be very difficult to defend.
The Greeks did not determine Being as Anwesenheit. Being itself
bequeathed itself to them in that way, and in so doing it lay
the groundwork for its own future development.
Being, in other words, determines its own history and it does so
itself, without human 'discovery' or 'innovation' being necessary
for the development of this history. Such discovery and/or
innovation
is itself the gift of Being to humanity."
Perhaps this is directed at Phil Miller, as I left open the Q about
whether Heidegger's history of being was a teleology. But the Q
is--and this is another way of asking a previous question--if it is
a teleology, what's its telos or end? I.e., looking forward,
where's it going? Can a Janus-headed history, with future
historical possibilities of *either* 'salvation' or else continued
self-satiated decline qualify as a telos? (The Judeo-Christian
resonances seem obvious to me--here in a "works not faith"
moment--but it is also necessary to ask other questions, unless one
feels that the theological interpretation is discursively
exhaustive, as Heid himself did not).
The above goes on: "The Greeks did not determine Being as
Anwesenheit." Of course not; because the Greeks didn't ever
experience being *as* Anwesenheit! It's only after the Greek
understanding of being has undergone several decisive shifts, each
of which takes it further away from the temporal dynamism inherent
in its origins, that we come to think being as presence.
Heidegger's views on these matters undergoe a dramatic shift after
B&T, and he gives several slightly different accounts of the
evolution from being to presence, but what is clear is that the
Greeks received being as Eon with Parmenides, for example).
But what does it mean to receive being--that being is "sent"
as Heidegger puts it?
The post then says: "Being, in other words, determines its
own history and it does so
itself, without human 'discovery' or 'innovation' being necessary
for the development of this history. Such discovery and/or
innovation
is itself the gift of Being to humanity."
There is a considerable tension between these two sentences. What
does it mean that "being determines its own history?" The Q we've
been asking is how to read the role being plays with respect to the
unfolding of history. Determines is a very strong word here! Even
if the ways in which being is first implicitly experienced in the
practices and explicitly named by the thinker lays down certain
parameters of thought which circumscribe the domain of possible
understandings of being--if not the order and precise configuration
according to which they end up happening--this still wouldn't really
be "determining." Hence the quotes from T&B and the Heraclitus
Seminar (which for me still leave many Qs unanswered).
What does it mean that discovery and innovation are the gift
of being to humanity? Can we minimize the coefficient of
metaphoricity on this statement? For once we stop thinking of being
anthrotheologically, then 'discovery and innovations' being 'gifts'
says nothing to undermine the formative role played by human beings
in profoundly shaping the ways in which being has (and will)
continue to unfold in time. And you are certainly right that
Heidegger has a marked tendency, especially after the war, to
deemphasize the role of human being vis-a-vis being in shaping the
happening of being (or 'destiny'), but, not only are there other
influences acting on his rhetoric at this point (which haven't been
discussed), he nevertheless is mostly very careful to point out the
being-human being isomorphism, i.e., that being needs dasein just as
dasein needs being! And what else is Ereignis but an attempt to
think the way in which being and human being 'come together' to make
intelligibility happen?
Thanks for the oppotunity to dwell with these questions a little
longer (does this mean one can dwell in the spaceless space of the
internet?)
Iain Thomson
UCSD Philosophy
)
"
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------
I believe that
"an argument that the History of Being is anything but a teleological
one in a very strong sense is going to be very difficult to defend.
The Greeks did not determine Being as Anwesenheit. Being itself
bequeathed itself to them in that way, and in so doing it lay
the groundwork for its own future development.
Being, in other words, determines its own history and it does so
itself, without human 'discovery' or 'innovation' being necessary
for the development of this history. Such discovery and/or
innovation
is itself the gift of Being to humanity."
Perhaps this is directed at Phil Miller, as I left open the Q about
whether Heidegger's history of being was a teleology. But the Q
is--and this is another way of asking a previous question--if it is
a teleology, what's its telos or end? I.e., looking forward,
where's it going? Can a Janus-headed history, with future
historical possibilities of *either* 'salvation' or else continued
self-satiated decline qualify as a telos? (The Judeo-Christian
resonances seem obvious to me--here in a "works not faith"
moment--but it is also necessary to ask other questions, unless one
feels that the theological interpretation is discursively
exhaustive, as Heid himself did not).
The above goes on: "The Greeks did not determine Being as
Anwesenheit." Of course not; because the Greeks didn't ever
experience being *as* Anwesenheit! It's only after the Greek
understanding of being has undergone several decisive shifts, each
of which takes it further away from the temporal dynamism inherent
in its origins, that we come to think being as presence.
Heidegger's views on these matters undergoe a dramatic shift after
B&T, and he gives several slightly different accounts of the
evolution from being to presence, but what is clear is that the
Greeks received being as Eon with Parmenides, for example).
But what does it mean to receive being--that being is "sent"
as Heidegger puts it?
The post then says: "Being, in other words, determines its
own history and it does so
itself, without human 'discovery' or 'innovation' being necessary
for the development of this history. Such discovery and/or
innovation
is itself the gift of Being to humanity."
There is a considerable tension between these two sentences. What
does it mean that "being determines its own history?" The Q we've
been asking is how to read the role being plays with respect to the
unfolding of history. Determines is a very strong word here! Even
if the ways in which being is first implicitly experienced in the
practices and explicitly named by the thinker lays down certain
parameters of thought which circumscribe the domain of possible
understandings of being--if not the order and precise configuration
according to which they end up happening--this still wouldn't really
be "determining." Hence the quotes from T&B and the Heraclitus
Seminar (which for me still leave many Qs unanswered).
What does it mean that discovery and innovation are the gift
of being to humanity? Can we minimize the coefficient of
metaphoricity on this statement? For once we stop thinking of being
anthrotheologically, then 'discovery and innovations' being 'gifts'
says nothing to undermine the formative role played by human beings
in profoundly shaping the ways in which being has (and will)
continue to unfold in time. And you are certainly right that
Heidegger has a marked tendency, especially after the war, to
deemphasize the role of human being vis-a-vis being in shaping the
happening of being (or 'destiny'), but, not only are there other
influences acting on his rhetoric at this point (which haven't been
discussed), he nevertheless is mostly very careful to point out the
being-human being isomorphism, i.e., that being needs dasein just as
dasein needs being! And what else is Ereignis but an attempt to
think the way in which being and human being 'come together' to make
intelligibility happen?
Thanks for the oppotunity to dwell with these questions a little
longer (does this mean one can dwell in the spaceless space of the
internet?)
Iain Thomson
UCSD Philosophy
)
"
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------