Robert, you are very right, very true. Not at all a nuissance. I am not
sure how to respond, except to say that dissent should definitely be
encouraged.
My comments follow...
On Fri, 1 Dec 1995, Robert V. Scheetz wrote:
> I have great difficulty with these types of constructions, "...nothingness 'is'".
> "Nothingness is not simply privation,....", "grounded in nullity...".
> Semanitcally they are logical surds. So I can't see that it's a "fair question to ask", "Why
> nothingness 'is'?" I'm tramelled up in its violence to logic. But, I certainly agree
> that at this point "ontology has failed and that we have moved out of
> ontology into metaphysics." Instinctively, one wants to shift out of the
> genre of rigorous thinking and into poetry/myth. And if one reads
> B&T as, say, a "Berlin method" version of "The Wasteland," the
> paradoxicality, tautology, ambiguity are not inappropriate, and the
> themes and imagery and queer usages convey insight and force....
Your last point is amusing, very imaginative. But "queer usages"? What is
your meaning?
I do believe that
Heidegger means to do logic some violence, so if this is the complaint, I
agree. But I do not sympathize with the loss of rigor in his account. I
have never understood why logic is the only rigorous way to think, or
even what we mean by logic, even if what You mean by logic may be clear
to you. We can discuss this privately, if you wish to argue that one
around the block a few times.
And yes, he does flee philosphy in the end, for poetry and myth. But
is that really so strange or bad? I find it to be kind of endearing,
almost...
> Christian onto-theology speaks of "dying into life" (baptism ritual),
>sacrificial death,
> memento mori, martyrdom.... Epicureanism, Stoicism, Zen...but always
>the theme
> is dogmatically grounded??? So again, we've abondoned ontology for
>metaphysics.
All I can say is that perhaps it is high time we started to explore how
these dogmas ground our ontological understandings, instead of pretending
that they don't. But would you disagree?
> Also, I don't see how an Husserlean phenomenolgy can be ontological. H insists
> on the ontic vs. ontological difference, but then proceeds to conflate them with
> the use of phenomenal (ontic) predicates (like "care", "self", "awareness",
> "respect",...) for Dasein. He insists that Being is not an Essent, and immediately
> substantivizes it as "Dasein" and even speaks of the "being of Dasein".
> He claims to be doing phenomenological analysis but abritrarily conflates
> "meaning" qua description (i.e. phenomenal manifestations) with meaning
> qua moral value (e.g. authenticity, falling).
Anyone who has ever engaged in the descriptive project of phenomenology
has always already :) assumed a moral or ethical stance, I don't care
what they say. The very way the question is framed, the very question
which is asked, betrays this allience. It is forgivable, perhaps, only
>from the realization that the descriptive and the prescriptive projects
are inseparable.
The theme of death does not come out of nowhere, but is grounded in a
long tradition, to which you point, and which Heidegger does not escape.
It is dogmatic, even if he gives 'reasons' for its necessity in virtue of
Dasein's ontological structure. I am myself contesting its necessity, but
I imagine it is from a different perspective from yours. I would be
interested in knowing what your perspective is, where you see yourself in
philosophy. Myself, I am 'grounded' in feminisms, so that the cat is now
out of the bag. Your turn...
Cheers,
rita
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
sure how to respond, except to say that dissent should definitely be
encouraged.
My comments follow...
On Fri, 1 Dec 1995, Robert V. Scheetz wrote:
> I have great difficulty with these types of constructions, "...nothingness 'is'".
> "Nothingness is not simply privation,....", "grounded in nullity...".
> Semanitcally they are logical surds. So I can't see that it's a "fair question to ask", "Why
> nothingness 'is'?" I'm tramelled up in its violence to logic. But, I certainly agree
> that at this point "ontology has failed and that we have moved out of
> ontology into metaphysics." Instinctively, one wants to shift out of the
> genre of rigorous thinking and into poetry/myth. And if one reads
> B&T as, say, a "Berlin method" version of "The Wasteland," the
> paradoxicality, tautology, ambiguity are not inappropriate, and the
> themes and imagery and queer usages convey insight and force....
Your last point is amusing, very imaginative. But "queer usages"? What is
your meaning?
I do believe that
Heidegger means to do logic some violence, so if this is the complaint, I
agree. But I do not sympathize with the loss of rigor in his account. I
have never understood why logic is the only rigorous way to think, or
even what we mean by logic, even if what You mean by logic may be clear
to you. We can discuss this privately, if you wish to argue that one
around the block a few times.
And yes, he does flee philosphy in the end, for poetry and myth. But
is that really so strange or bad? I find it to be kind of endearing,
almost...
> Christian onto-theology speaks of "dying into life" (baptism ritual),
>sacrificial death,
> memento mori, martyrdom.... Epicureanism, Stoicism, Zen...but always
>the theme
> is dogmatically grounded??? So again, we've abondoned ontology for
>metaphysics.
All I can say is that perhaps it is high time we started to explore how
these dogmas ground our ontological understandings, instead of pretending
that they don't. But would you disagree?
> Also, I don't see how an Husserlean phenomenolgy can be ontological. H insists
> on the ontic vs. ontological difference, but then proceeds to conflate them with
> the use of phenomenal (ontic) predicates (like "care", "self", "awareness",
> "respect",...) for Dasein. He insists that Being is not an Essent, and immediately
> substantivizes it as "Dasein" and even speaks of the "being of Dasein".
> He claims to be doing phenomenological analysis but abritrarily conflates
> "meaning" qua description (i.e. phenomenal manifestations) with meaning
> qua moral value (e.g. authenticity, falling).
Anyone who has ever engaged in the descriptive project of phenomenology
has always already :) assumed a moral or ethical stance, I don't care
what they say. The very way the question is framed, the very question
which is asked, betrays this allience. It is forgivable, perhaps, only
>from the realization that the descriptive and the prescriptive projects
are inseparable.
The theme of death does not come out of nowhere, but is grounded in a
long tradition, to which you point, and which Heidegger does not escape.
It is dogmatic, even if he gives 'reasons' for its necessity in virtue of
Dasein's ontological structure. I am myself contesting its necessity, but
I imagine it is from a different perspective from yours. I would be
interested in knowing what your perspective is, where you see yourself in
philosophy. Myself, I am 'grounded' in feminisms, so that the cat is now
out of the bag. Your turn...
Cheers,
rita
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---