Iain Thomson wrote:
>
> Sounds like a plain ol' false assertion to me. You might want to
> reread "On the Essence of Truth," where Heidegger first recounts the
> *history* of truth...
> Iain
>
> >Truth doesn't have a history.
I also suggest looking at the first Nietzsche lecture, "The Will to
Power as Art", which has an extensive discussion of the essence of truth
as historical through and through; see also the Parmenides lecture
course (which is a thorough treatment of the history of the essence of
truth).
> Being does, and Heidegger got the
> History
>
> of Being wrong because of his false conception of what Truth is.
Hate to be a pedant, but claims like this get circled in red with the
word EXPAND scrawled in the margin. Being able to assert that Heidegger
has a 'false conception' of anything requires elaboration of what the
essence of falsity is (which Heidegger rigorously distinguishes from
untruth in "On the Essence of Truth" and in _Parmenides_). Not to
mention clarification of what exactly Heidegger's 'conception of truth'
is to begin with.
To claim that Heidegger's questioning concerning the essence of truth
operates according to 'rejection of correspondance' (as Mr. Rickey
writes), or, for that matter, that it rests on a reason / revelation
opposition is spurious, or, at least, truncated exegesis. Heidegger
never claims to oppose one theory of truth to all the others to show why
they're wrong; his approach is to scrutinize the Greek 'aletheia' as
un-concealment (and, later, as dis-closing, Ent-bergung). Dis-closing
(essentially intertwined with concealment or sheltering (Verbergung)) is
prior to truth of assertion, truth of correspondance, etc.; it comes to
pass in accordance with the epochality of being, hence under the sway of
epochal principles, but this is no simple relativism. The assertions or
representations proper to each historical epoch may not be immutably
true, but this does not alter the hidden (i.e., *unthought*) sense of
a-letheia.
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>
> Sounds like a plain ol' false assertion to me. You might want to
> reread "On the Essence of Truth," where Heidegger first recounts the
> *history* of truth...
> Iain
>
> >Truth doesn't have a history.
I also suggest looking at the first Nietzsche lecture, "The Will to
Power as Art", which has an extensive discussion of the essence of truth
as historical through and through; see also the Parmenides lecture
course (which is a thorough treatment of the history of the essence of
truth).
> Being does, and Heidegger got the
> History
>
> of Being wrong because of his false conception of what Truth is.
Hate to be a pedant, but claims like this get circled in red with the
word EXPAND scrawled in the margin. Being able to assert that Heidegger
has a 'false conception' of anything requires elaboration of what the
essence of falsity is (which Heidegger rigorously distinguishes from
untruth in "On the Essence of Truth" and in _Parmenides_). Not to
mention clarification of what exactly Heidegger's 'conception of truth'
is to begin with.
To claim that Heidegger's questioning concerning the essence of truth
operates according to 'rejection of correspondance' (as Mr. Rickey
writes), or, for that matter, that it rests on a reason / revelation
opposition is spurious, or, at least, truncated exegesis. Heidegger
never claims to oppose one theory of truth to all the others to show why
they're wrong; his approach is to scrutinize the Greek 'aletheia' as
un-concealment (and, later, as dis-closing, Ent-bergung). Dis-closing
(essentially intertwined with concealment or sheltering (Verbergung)) is
prior to truth of assertion, truth of correspondance, etc.; it comes to
pass in accordance with the epochality of being, hence under the sway of
epochal principles, but this is no simple relativism. The assertions or
representations proper to each historical epoch may not be immutably
true, but this does not alter the hidden (i.e., *unthought*) sense of
a-letheia.
Cheers,
Paul Murphy
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---