> > Being does, and Heidegger got the
> > History
> >
> > of Being wrong because of his false conception of what Truth is.
>
> Hate to be a pedant, but claims like this get circled in red with the
> word EXPAND scrawled in the margin. Being able to assert that Heidegger
> has a 'false conception' of anything requires elaboration of what the
> essence of falsity is (which Heidegger rigorously distinguishes from
> untruth in "On the Essence of Truth" and in _Parmenides_). Not to
> mention clarification of what exactly Heidegger's 'conception of truth'
> is to begin with.
What makes you think you're the teacher and I'm the student? Maybe
instead of grading my remarks you could simply ask me to expand.
> To claim that Heidegger's questioning concerning the essence of truth
> operates according to 'rejection of correspondance' (as Mr. Rickey
> writes), or, for that matter, that it rests on a reason / revelation
> opposition is spurious, or, at least, truncated exegesis. Heidegger
> never claims to oppose one theory of truth to all the others to show why
> they're wrong; his approach is to scrutinize the Greek 'aletheia' as
> un-concealment (and, later, as dis-closing, Ent-bergung). Dis-closing
> (essentially intertwined with concealment or sheltering (Verbergung)) is
> prior to truth of assertion, truth of correspondance, etc.; it comes to
> pass in accordance with the epochality of being, hence under the sway of
> epochal principles, but this is no simple relativism. The assertions or
> representations proper to each historical epoch may not be immutably
> true, but this does not alter the hidden (i.e., *unthought*) sense of
> a-letheia.
Okay, so it's no simple relativism. I know what is at issue. But is a
complex relativism worth anything?
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> > History
> >
> > of Being wrong because of his false conception of what Truth is.
>
> Hate to be a pedant, but claims like this get circled in red with the
> word EXPAND scrawled in the margin. Being able to assert that Heidegger
> has a 'false conception' of anything requires elaboration of what the
> essence of falsity is (which Heidegger rigorously distinguishes from
> untruth in "On the Essence of Truth" and in _Parmenides_). Not to
> mention clarification of what exactly Heidegger's 'conception of truth'
> is to begin with.
What makes you think you're the teacher and I'm the student? Maybe
instead of grading my remarks you could simply ask me to expand.
> To claim that Heidegger's questioning concerning the essence of truth
> operates according to 'rejection of correspondance' (as Mr. Rickey
> writes), or, for that matter, that it rests on a reason / revelation
> opposition is spurious, or, at least, truncated exegesis. Heidegger
> never claims to oppose one theory of truth to all the others to show why
> they're wrong; his approach is to scrutinize the Greek 'aletheia' as
> un-concealment (and, later, as dis-closing, Ent-bergung). Dis-closing
> (essentially intertwined with concealment or sheltering (Verbergung)) is
> prior to truth of assertion, truth of correspondance, etc.; it comes to
> pass in accordance with the epochality of being, hence under the sway of
> epochal principles, but this is no simple relativism. The assertions or
> representations proper to each historical epoch may not be immutably
> true, but this does not alter the hidden (i.e., *unthought*) sense of
> a-letheia.
Okay, so it's no simple relativism. I know what is at issue. But is a
complex relativism worth anything?
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---