> I think that H and St. Thomas are frankly approaching the question of
> truth, and of being as well, from two completely different standpoints.
> Thomas, as far as I know him (which isn't very well - I should be ashamed,
> attending Catholic University as I am), seems interested in establishing
> a metaphysics of existence grounded in a pre-understanding of being
> as being-created ex nihilio, whereas Heidegger is questioning after the
> structure of this pre-understanding itself.
I guess Heidegger's success at getting at this pre-understanding is what
is at issue. Maybe he just tried to question too far. As Aristotle says,
it's a sign of intelligence to know when to stop trying to prove what
can't be proven. Maybe you can only question so far what can't be
questioned? You can only question so far what hides itself?
> I would also venture to assert that the same thing can be PHENOMENOLOGICALLY
> primary and METAPHYSICALLY secondary. Truth as disclosure is the
> ground for the possibility of truth as correctness, but that doesn't
> mean that truth as correctness is necessarily less 'in itself' (in the
> Aristotelian sense) or metaphysically derivative of the former. Just
> as we need eyes to conduct physiology; doing physiology presupposes
> having eyes, but isn't derivative of eyesight in a metaphysical sense.
> Indeed, physiology should (theoretically) explain how eyes work in
> the first place.
So I guess if metaphysics is no longer primary we have to overcome
metaphysics. But I'm not so sure Heidegger had it right.
> Has anybody here looked at Caputo's book Heidegger and Aquinas? He's
> a bit self-righteous as always but its an interesting work.
Yes, I enjoyed that book.
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> truth, and of being as well, from two completely different standpoints.
> Thomas, as far as I know him (which isn't very well - I should be ashamed,
> attending Catholic University as I am), seems interested in establishing
> a metaphysics of existence grounded in a pre-understanding of being
> as being-created ex nihilio, whereas Heidegger is questioning after the
> structure of this pre-understanding itself.
I guess Heidegger's success at getting at this pre-understanding is what
is at issue. Maybe he just tried to question too far. As Aristotle says,
it's a sign of intelligence to know when to stop trying to prove what
can't be proven. Maybe you can only question so far what can't be
questioned? You can only question so far what hides itself?
> I would also venture to assert that the same thing can be PHENOMENOLOGICALLY
> primary and METAPHYSICALLY secondary. Truth as disclosure is the
> ground for the possibility of truth as correctness, but that doesn't
> mean that truth as correctness is necessarily less 'in itself' (in the
> Aristotelian sense) or metaphysically derivative of the former. Just
> as we need eyes to conduct physiology; doing physiology presupposes
> having eyes, but isn't derivative of eyesight in a metaphysical sense.
> Indeed, physiology should (theoretically) explain how eyes work in
> the first place.
So I guess if metaphysics is no longer primary we have to overcome
metaphysics. But I'm not so sure Heidegger had it right.
> Has anybody here looked at Caputo's book Heidegger and Aquinas? He's
> a bit self-righteous as always but its an interesting work.
Yes, I enjoyed that book.
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---