If one says: X
(a statement)
is true whenever Y
(Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be true,
etc)
then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
statement, like X, like all Xs)).
If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
(compressed as the truth of Z);
on the other hand if Z is untrue
(i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue whenever
Y)
then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all possible
occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
Or am I thoroughly confused?
regards
michaelP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
(a statement)
is true whenever Y
(Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be true,
etc)
then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
statement, like X, like all Xs)).
If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
(compressed as the truth of Z);
on the other hand if Z is untrue
(i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue whenever
Y)
then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all possible
occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
Or am I thoroughly confused?
regards
michaelP
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---