Hi, Michael,
I'm replacing your terms with those of Chrysippus.
> If one says: X
> (a statement)
> is true whenever Y
> (Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be
true,
> etc)
X=it is light
Y=it is day
Z = If it is day, then it is (necessarily) light.
> then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
> definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
> statement, like X, like all Xs)).
>
> If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
> (compressed as the truth of Z);
> on the other hand if Z is untrue
> (i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue
whenever
> Y)
Z' = If it is day, Not (it is light)
> then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
> speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
Z' may be true (some of the time) during a solar eclipse - or dark cloud
cover signifying an impeding storm. It depends on how much light is light.
Which version of the truth do you want?
Your setting ahead of time whether Z or Z' based on opinion, experience, or
dogma. The conclusion is already assumed, not discovered. The "truth" of Z
is not established by its own form of 'X is true whenever Y'.
If you already set "If X, then Y", then NOT Z (~Z) would be an "invalid"
statement. Validity is not the same as truth-value. But truth depends on
what you are filling in as the variables, while the abstract placeholders
remain the same. The issue of truth is one of content, not of syntaxic
validity. The truth of the statement is often presupposed intuitively by
the content and is not generated by syntax or eutax. Quine -> most
statements taken to be analytic a priori are not so at all. If we can agree
that day and light are equivalent in meaning, then such a statement would be
analytic a priori (and pretty useless at best). But I doubt this is the case
for any referents other than mathematicals and perhaps some simple synonyms.
> thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all
possible
> occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
> commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
>
> Or am I thoroughly confused?
>
I lost you on the last sentence.
I hope this didn't add to the confusion.
Marilynn
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
I'm replacing your terms with those of Chrysippus.
> If one says: X
> (a statement)
> is true whenever Y
> (Y being a set of conditions and/or criteria for something said to be
true,
> etc)
X=it is light
Y=it is day
Z = If it is day, then it is (necessarily) light.
> then one also has to ask whether by the same criteria (Y) whether the
> definition/rule 'X is true whenever Y' (= Z) is true too (since it is a
> statement, like X, like all Xs)).
>
> If Z is true (by the above criteria) then all's well with the theory
> (compressed as the truth of Z);
> on the other hand if Z is untrue
> (i.e., Z is not true when Y, i.e., 'X is true whenever Y' is untrue
whenever
> Y)
Z' = If it is day, Not (it is light)
> then the entire theory dissolves (one can never tell the truth whilst
> speaking the statements of the theory (of whatever).
Z' may be true (some of the time) during a solar eclipse - or dark cloud
cover signifying an impeding storm. It depends on how much light is light.
Which version of the truth do you want?
Your setting ahead of time whether Z or Z' based on opinion, experience, or
dogma. The conclusion is already assumed, not discovered. The "truth" of Z
is not established by its own form of 'X is true whenever Y'.
If you already set "If X, then Y", then NOT Z (~Z) would be an "invalid"
statement. Validity is not the same as truth-value. But truth depends on
what you are filling in as the variables, while the abstract placeholders
remain the same. The issue of truth is one of content, not of syntaxic
validity. The truth of the statement is often presupposed intuitively by
the content and is not generated by syntax or eutax. Quine -> most
statements taken to be analytic a priori are not so at all. If we can agree
that day and light are equivalent in meaning, then such a statement would be
analytic a priori (and pretty useless at best). But I doubt this is the case
for any referents other than mathematicals and perhaps some simple synonyms.
> thus this can be a test of the theory (rather than testing for all
possible
> occurrences of X or taking Z on faith or considering Z a matter of
> commonsense or the veracity of tradition, etc)
>
> Or am I thoroughly confused?
>
I lost you on the last sentence.
I hope this didn't add to the confusion.
Marilynn
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---