I haven't studies David's summary of Chapter II yet,
but I thought that what he posted on Chapter I was
generally good. I find very little there to take
issue with.
The one point I do have trouble with is the
statement that "Without the ekstatic ahead-of-itself-ness
of Dasein, Dasein simply could not be-_towards_ anything."
Not all being-towards is being-towards a possibility. I
can also be-towards a thing, like a picture on the wall
(cf. SZ 217f/BT 260). I don't think this is a trivial
point, for unless we put being-towards-death in the
broader context of being-towards-anything, I think we miss
some of the subtleties of what Heidegger is doing here.
Heidegger's phenomenology of discourse and truth is in the
background of the whole of Chapter I, and at one point, in
section 52, it comes quite explicitly to the foreground
256/300).
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
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but I thought that what he posted on Chapter I was
generally good. I find very little there to take
issue with.
The one point I do have trouble with is the
statement that "Without the ekstatic ahead-of-itself-ness
of Dasein, Dasein simply could not be-_towards_ anything."
Not all being-towards is being-towards a possibility. I
can also be-towards a thing, like a picture on the wall
(cf. SZ 217f/BT 260). I don't think this is a trivial
point, for unless we put being-towards-death in the
broader context of being-towards-anything, I think we miss
some of the subtleties of what Heidegger is doing here.
Heidegger's phenomenology of discourse and truth is in the
background of the whole of Chapter I, and at one point, in
section 52, it comes quite explicitly to the foreground
256/300).
-- Phil Miller
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
------------------