> "Why does aletheia as you understand it necessarily exclude a god?"
> The other way round: Why does it need it? Then everything gets hung up
again on
> a supreme being. Back to square one.
Is this the philosophical summit, then, that in the end thinking can only
affirm the eternity of the world (no god required) and can never see the
beginning of the world? i.e. a beginning revealed for the mystery of
Geschick ex nihilo?
> How come one meaning here is originary and the other derivative? Why do
words
> point in the first place to things standing present to hand? What kind of
> privileging and hierarchization is at work here that focuses primarily on
neatly
> outlined substantives? Could there be a meaning of being at work here
that is
> being taken at face value?
Maybe we have to first be given something so that we can find ourselves in
giving it away. Maybe we have to first be given ousia in order to be open
to the grace of renouncing property.
> "How is openness different from the passive intellect?"
> The openness of being is open not just to intellect, but also to
moodedness.
> Intellect is an entity or a faculty of an entity (the psyche); being's
openness
> is a dimension, not an entity. They are incommensuarable.
Who says intellect is an entity or a faculty of an entity? It doesn't have
to be that way. The question is open.
Intellect and moodedness belong to the soul. The soul is itself open to
being by the passive intellect, which informs the moodedness of the soul.
The soul is open to being through time, the time that is a dimension and
not an entity. Perhaps time is already the much-ballyhooed openness of
aletheia. If we think time properly then perhaps thinking need not grope
for what it hopes will be the next sending of being.
Heidegger misunderstood time.
> There's nothing mystical about our understanding of being, which is
> all-too-mundane. There is also nothing mystical about trying to get some
> distance from this self-evident understanding. It is the simplicity that
is hard
> here. Mysticism implies some sort of revelation of truths beyond the
> understanding.
Makes sense if boredom is the revelation of the whole. Then the most boring
of boring things will be to bore through to the simplex.
I agree. But isn't the move to understand what makes everyday understanding
possible a move beyond understanding? i.e. in a self-recursive sense:
understanding pulling itself up by its own bootstraps? It is transcendence
understood in a peculiar way. That is, it is peculiar in the way you want
to remove all flavour of Christianity from it. But the self-recursive move
beyond understanding is a denial of self initiated by the self in order to
find its true self. You may want to express the movement in words that ring
all the right bells with you, but the phenomenon is the same.
> Why the to-and-fro between something and nothing? Here it is not a matter
of
> beings or non-beings but of modes of being.
Is nothing a mode of being?
> "Where did Aristotle locate this giving power?"
> As far as I know, he didn't (unless one wants to take recourse to the
god). In
> Plato it is presumably the idea of the idea or the idea of the agathon,
but
> Plato did not elaborate on this. Neither Plato nor Aristotle thought
aletheia;
> it was the self-evident, unthought given of their thinking. Just as you
are
> striving to overlook this dimension and tie everything back to beings of
one
> sort or another.
No, I want to keep that dimension in sight. But we can only think Being
through beings, can't we? Should we not then be as precise as we can in our
understanding of beings?
> "It seems this is just one interpretation of entelecheia and energeia
(the
> Heideggerian one) which I think is incomplete."
> Some answer! And what do you actually think when you renounce this pose
of
> dynamic superiority?
Not sure I follow you. Are you just asking me to spell out how I think
Heidegger got it wrong?
Chris Morrissey
More C Communications Inc.
a Microsoft Solution Provider
http://www.moreC.com voice or fax 604.877.7731
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
> The other way round: Why does it need it? Then everything gets hung up
again on
> a supreme being. Back to square one.
Is this the philosophical summit, then, that in the end thinking can only
affirm the eternity of the world (no god required) and can never see the
beginning of the world? i.e. a beginning revealed for the mystery of
Geschick ex nihilo?
> How come one meaning here is originary and the other derivative? Why do
words
> point in the first place to things standing present to hand? What kind of
> privileging and hierarchization is at work here that focuses primarily on
neatly
> outlined substantives? Could there be a meaning of being at work here
that is
> being taken at face value?
Maybe we have to first be given something so that we can find ourselves in
giving it away. Maybe we have to first be given ousia in order to be open
to the grace of renouncing property.
> "How is openness different from the passive intellect?"
> The openness of being is open not just to intellect, but also to
moodedness.
> Intellect is an entity or a faculty of an entity (the psyche); being's
openness
> is a dimension, not an entity. They are incommensuarable.
Who says intellect is an entity or a faculty of an entity? It doesn't have
to be that way. The question is open.
Intellect and moodedness belong to the soul. The soul is itself open to
being by the passive intellect, which informs the moodedness of the soul.
The soul is open to being through time, the time that is a dimension and
not an entity. Perhaps time is already the much-ballyhooed openness of
aletheia. If we think time properly then perhaps thinking need not grope
for what it hopes will be the next sending of being.
Heidegger misunderstood time.
> There's nothing mystical about our understanding of being, which is
> all-too-mundane. There is also nothing mystical about trying to get some
> distance from this self-evident understanding. It is the simplicity that
is hard
> here. Mysticism implies some sort of revelation of truths beyond the
> understanding.
Makes sense if boredom is the revelation of the whole. Then the most boring
of boring things will be to bore through to the simplex.
I agree. But isn't the move to understand what makes everyday understanding
possible a move beyond understanding? i.e. in a self-recursive sense:
understanding pulling itself up by its own bootstraps? It is transcendence
understood in a peculiar way. That is, it is peculiar in the way you want
to remove all flavour of Christianity from it. But the self-recursive move
beyond understanding is a denial of self initiated by the self in order to
find its true self. You may want to express the movement in words that ring
all the right bells with you, but the phenomenon is the same.
> Why the to-and-fro between something and nothing? Here it is not a matter
of
> beings or non-beings but of modes of being.
Is nothing a mode of being?
> "Where did Aristotle locate this giving power?"
> As far as I know, he didn't (unless one wants to take recourse to the
god). In
> Plato it is presumably the idea of the idea or the idea of the agathon,
but
> Plato did not elaborate on this. Neither Plato nor Aristotle thought
aletheia;
> it was the self-evident, unthought given of their thinking. Just as you
are
> striving to overlook this dimension and tie everything back to beings of
one
> sort or another.
No, I want to keep that dimension in sight. But we can only think Being
through beings, can't we? Should we not then be as precise as we can in our
understanding of beings?
> "It seems this is just one interpretation of entelecheia and energeia
(the
> Heideggerian one) which I think is incomplete."
> Some answer! And what do you actually think when you renounce this pose
of
> dynamic superiority?
Not sure I follow you. Are you just asking me to spell out how I think
Heidegger got it wrong?
Chris Morrissey
More C Communications Inc.
a Microsoft Solution Provider
http://www.moreC.com voice or fax 604.877.7731
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---