At 10:24 PM 9/20/96 +0100, M.Eldred_artefact wrote:
>Cologne, 20 September 1996
>
>Erika wrote:
>"Where does this "value" idea come from?.."
>
>As far as I can tell, it's a swipe at the 'value-theoretical Criticism,
one
>school of Neo-Kantianism in the first part of this century whose main
>representatives were W. Windelband,
Is it a swipe though? It seems that he's building on this neo-kantian
opposition to shore up his all important distinction between what's
"ready to hand" vs. what's "present to hand". That's the gist of
Chris's response:
>>>>
<excerpt>One must attend to the inverted commas which indicate that
Heidegger is
using someone else's words. He is referring to neo-Kantian philosophy
(which school escapes me at the moment). The point he wishes to make
is
that things appear in the world as meaningful and "valuable" as they
appear; contrary to what neo-kantians thought, the value is not
"invested"
by the will after the bare empirical appearance of a thing.
</excerpt><<<<<<<<
The setting into place of that distinction seems to be one of the more
important interventions accomplished by Being and Time. The swipe, as
always in B&T, is against Husserl and his cartesion notion of
phenomenology. The value reference is probably also to Dilthey.
Regards,
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Moskal
Brooklyn USA
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
>Cologne, 20 September 1996
>
>Erika wrote:
>"Where does this "value" idea come from?.."
>
>As far as I can tell, it's a swipe at the 'value-theoretical Criticism,
one
>school of Neo-Kantianism in the first part of this century whose main
>representatives were W. Windelband,
Is it a swipe though? It seems that he's building on this neo-kantian
opposition to shore up his all important distinction between what's
"ready to hand" vs. what's "present to hand". That's the gist of
Chris's response:
>>>>
<excerpt>One must attend to the inverted commas which indicate that
Heidegger is
using someone else's words. He is referring to neo-Kantian philosophy
(which school escapes me at the moment). The point he wishes to make
is
that things appear in the world as meaningful and "valuable" as they
appear; contrary to what neo-kantians thought, the value is not
"invested"
by the will after the bare empirical appearance of a thing.
</excerpt><<<<<<<<
The setting into place of that distinction seems to be one of the more
important interventions accomplished by Being and Time. The swipe, as
always in B&T, is against Husserl and his cartesion notion of
phenomenology. The value reference is probably also to Dilthey.
Regards,
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Moskal
Brooklyn USA
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---