> Conscience here is not a voice saying how I or the world or others should
be,
> but is the call that calls me back to my own individual, non-transferable
> existential time, which I am, will be and have been. The call of
conscience does
> not say anything in particular but confronts me with the ineluctability
that it
> will always have been I myself who casts myself in such-and-such a way.
(Thus it
> seems that "appropriate(d)ness" is a more adequate translation of
> "Eigentlichkeit" than "authenticity" because the former carries the
connotation
> of claiming one's own individual existence.)
Doesn't this smell like fatalism rather than conscience? "Why I am a
Destiny." I am my fate. Conscience is related to freedom, isn't it? (Insert
my too-general denunciation of Heidegger's conception of freedom here.)
Heidegger on conscience obliterates the word. In a catholic understanding
of conscience, conscience has to be informed. It is a knowing together,
con-scientia. For Heidegger, Dasein is an existential island. But this is a
one-sided emphasis, however insightful. Essentially, man is the political
animal.
> Heidegger's individuation is the individuation of a thinker. He
appropriates
> himself as individual, thinking existence by coming back to the tradition
in the
> radically individual way opened up by his sole question, thus freeing
himself
> from the encumbrances of the metaphysical tradition that had, up to that
point,
> apparently cut and dried all there was to say about Aristotle, Plato and
the
> other Greeks. As this thinking individual, Heidegger is an epochal,
historical
> figure who experiences his destiny as being claimed by being to think it
as
> such. After SZ and the turning, the unique Jeweiligkeit of Dasein becomes
> focused on appropriation by being itself; appropriatedness in the sense
of
> Eigentlichkeit becomes epochal, historical Dasein being appropriated by
the
> event of propriation in its casting of the being of beings. This turning
removes
> some of the possibilities of misunderstanding the dichotomy
> Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit as cultural criticism of 'mass society',
but
> Heidegger remains true to the experience of thinking (for oneself) as
principium
> individuationis.
Heidegger as an epochal, historical figure. The thinking individual whose
personal history is pregnant with cosmic significance. How wild the tenets
of this faith! Q: Is it nuttier than Christianity? A: I'll take
Vergil's Fourth Eclogue anyday.
Chris Morrissey
More C Communications Inc.
a Microsoft Solution Provider
http://www.moreC.com voice or fax 604.877.7731
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
be,
> but is the call that calls me back to my own individual, non-transferable
> existential time, which I am, will be and have been. The call of
conscience does
> not say anything in particular but confronts me with the ineluctability
that it
> will always have been I myself who casts myself in such-and-such a way.
(Thus it
> seems that "appropriate(d)ness" is a more adequate translation of
> "Eigentlichkeit" than "authenticity" because the former carries the
connotation
> of claiming one's own individual existence.)
Doesn't this smell like fatalism rather than conscience? "Why I am a
Destiny." I am my fate. Conscience is related to freedom, isn't it? (Insert
my too-general denunciation of Heidegger's conception of freedom here.)
Heidegger on conscience obliterates the word. In a catholic understanding
of conscience, conscience has to be informed. It is a knowing together,
con-scientia. For Heidegger, Dasein is an existential island. But this is a
one-sided emphasis, however insightful. Essentially, man is the political
animal.
> Heidegger's individuation is the individuation of a thinker. He
appropriates
> himself as individual, thinking existence by coming back to the tradition
in the
> radically individual way opened up by his sole question, thus freeing
himself
> from the encumbrances of the metaphysical tradition that had, up to that
point,
> apparently cut and dried all there was to say about Aristotle, Plato and
the
> other Greeks. As this thinking individual, Heidegger is an epochal,
historical
> figure who experiences his destiny as being claimed by being to think it
as
> such. After SZ and the turning, the unique Jeweiligkeit of Dasein becomes
> focused on appropriation by being itself; appropriatedness in the sense
of
> Eigentlichkeit becomes epochal, historical Dasein being appropriated by
the
> event of propriation in its casting of the being of beings. This turning
removes
> some of the possibilities of misunderstanding the dichotomy
> Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit as cultural criticism of 'mass society',
but
> Heidegger remains true to the experience of thinking (for oneself) as
principium
> individuationis.
Heidegger as an epochal, historical figure. The thinking individual whose
personal history is pregnant with cosmic significance. How wild the tenets
of this faith! Q: Is it nuttier than Christianity? A: I'll take
Vergil's Fourth Eclogue anyday.
Chris Morrissey
More C Communications Inc.
a Microsoft Solution Provider
http://www.moreC.com voice or fax 604.877.7731
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---