Cologne, 20 September 1996
Allen Scult quotes Heidegger's early lecture "The Concept of Time", which I have
been reading again this evening. This seems to me to be a completely non-pious
approach to conscience. The emphasis is laid on Dasein being time itself, not as
a what, but as its how: Dasein is timely (adverbial!). It casts itself
individually into its own unique future in coming back to who it has been.
Conscience, as one way of coming back to my has-been, makes it apparent that my
self-casting into the future leaves a shadow that I will be for as long as I
exist.
Heidegger emphasizes here that time is the principium individuationis which
individuates by confronting Dasein with the how of its own individual time in
the face of its own ultimate possibility: death. Who I am is how I lead my
existence. On my reading, there is not a trace of gnosticism here: there is no
secret knowledge, no deprecation of the body and matter as source of evil, no
devaluation of earthly existence. This understanding of conscience is also
completely non-mystical because there is no suggestion that Dasein gains any
access to a divine union, a oneness with the world or what have you. The only
common trait with mysticism I can see is the individuality of the experience.
Mysticism claims to lift the veil from the ineffable, say, of death, in a secret
knowing. Death for Dasein, by contrast, is a mystery that remains enfolded in
its own concealment. It is the inexorable going forward towards death that I
have to come to terms with individually, one way or the other. This
moving-towards casts its light and shadow on all aspects of my existence: who I
am, how I shape my existence with others, who I have been.
Conscience here is not a voice saying how I or the world or others should be,
but is the call that calls me back to my own individual, non-transferable
existential time, which I am, will be and have been. The call of conscience does
not say anything in particular but confronts me with the ineluctability that it
will always have been I myself who casts myself in such-and-such a way. (Thus it
seems that "appropriate(d)ness" is a more adequate translation of
"Eigentlichkeit" than "authenticity" because the former carries the connotation
of claiming one's own individual existence.)
Heidegger's individuation is the individuation of a thinker. He appropriates
himself as individual, thinking existence by coming back to the tradition in the
radically individual way opened up by his sole question, thus freeing himself
>from the encumbrances of the metaphysical tradition that had, up to that point,
apparently cut and dried all there was to say about Aristotle, Plato and the
other Greeks. As this thinking individual, Heidegger is an epochal, historical
figure who experiences his destiny as being claimed by being to think it as
such. After SZ and the turning, the unique Jeweiligkeit of Dasein becomes
focused on appropriation by being itself; appropriatedness in the sense of
Eigentlichkeit becomes epochal, historical Dasein being appropriated by the
event of propriation in its casting of the being of beings. This turning removes
some of the possibilities of misunderstanding the dichotomy
Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit as cultural criticism of 'mass society', but
Heidegger remains true to the experience of thinking (for oneself) as principium
individuationis.
Michael
\\\ '~': '' /// artefact text and translation ~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ -
.{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ made by art _ / ~ : ~:~ \./''/
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eldred
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---
Allen Scult quotes Heidegger's early lecture "The Concept of Time", which I have
been reading again this evening. This seems to me to be a completely non-pious
approach to conscience. The emphasis is laid on Dasein being time itself, not as
a what, but as its how: Dasein is timely (adverbial!). It casts itself
individually into its own unique future in coming back to who it has been.
Conscience, as one way of coming back to my has-been, makes it apparent that my
self-casting into the future leaves a shadow that I will be for as long as I
exist.
Heidegger emphasizes here that time is the principium individuationis which
individuates by confronting Dasein with the how of its own individual time in
the face of its own ultimate possibility: death. Who I am is how I lead my
existence. On my reading, there is not a trace of gnosticism here: there is no
secret knowledge, no deprecation of the body and matter as source of evil, no
devaluation of earthly existence. This understanding of conscience is also
completely non-mystical because there is no suggestion that Dasein gains any
access to a divine union, a oneness with the world or what have you. The only
common trait with mysticism I can see is the individuality of the experience.
Mysticism claims to lift the veil from the ineffable, say, of death, in a secret
knowing. Death for Dasein, by contrast, is a mystery that remains enfolded in
its own concealment. It is the inexorable going forward towards death that I
have to come to terms with individually, one way or the other. This
moving-towards casts its light and shadow on all aspects of my existence: who I
am, how I shape my existence with others, who I have been.
Conscience here is not a voice saying how I or the world or others should be,
but is the call that calls me back to my own individual, non-transferable
existential time, which I am, will be and have been. The call of conscience does
not say anything in particular but confronts me with the ineluctability that it
will always have been I myself who casts myself in such-and-such a way. (Thus it
seems that "appropriate(d)ness" is a more adequate translation of
"Eigentlichkeit" than "authenticity" because the former carries the connotation
of claiming one's own individual existence.)
Heidegger's individuation is the individuation of a thinker. He appropriates
himself as individual, thinking existence by coming back to the tradition in the
radically individual way opened up by his sole question, thus freeing himself
>from the encumbrances of the metaphysical tradition that had, up to that point,
apparently cut and dried all there was to say about Aristotle, Plato and the
other Greeks. As this thinking individual, Heidegger is an epochal, historical
figure who experiences his destiny as being claimed by being to think it as
such. After SZ and the turning, the unique Jeweiligkeit of Dasein becomes
focused on appropriation by being itself; appropriatedness in the sense of
Eigentlichkeit becomes epochal, historical Dasein being appropriated by the
event of propriation in its casting of the being of beings. This turning removes
some of the possibilities of misunderstanding the dichotomy
Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit as cultural criticism of 'mass society', but
Heidegger remains true to the experience of thinking (for oneself) as principium
individuationis.
Michael
\\\ '~': '' /// artefact text and translation ~ \ ' ) ''' | . \ -
.{.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : ~ made by art _ / ~ : ~:~ \./''/
http://www.webcom.com/artefact/ {.\ ~. ' ~ { } .\ : artefact@xxxxxxxxxxx
vox: (++49 221) 9520 333 fax: (++49 221) 9520 334 Dr Michael Eldred
--- from list heidegger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---